What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this 'mediator view' of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Universe's origin.

中文翻译：

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机会如何解释

如何解释机会过程的结果？我们声称他们的设置可以。我们认为，机会通过设置来调节这些对结果的解释，但并不包含在其中。关于机会的事实确实在不同类型的解释中具有特色：高阶解释，它解释了设置如何以及为什么解释其结果。在本文中，我们阐明了这种偶然解释的“调解人观点”，并针对一系列反对意见为其辩护。然后我们展示它如何改变关于机会的四个形而上学争论的竞争环境。首先，它使即使很低的机会也具有解释力的说法更加合理。其次，它削弱了对机会还原论的循环论证。第三，它重新引导了关于反对机会认知理论的突出论点的辩论。最后，