This paper examines the credibility of threats to punish criminal offenders. The motivation is the sequential nature of crime and punishment, which unfolds as follows: enforcers threaten punishment, offenders commit crimes (or are deterred), and enforcers (possibly comprising different decision makers) enact punishments. The cost of carrying out threatened punishments after the fact is what potentially undermines the credibility of the initial threat. The model shows that, given the sequential nature of the crime and punishment game, multiple equilibria are possible entailing different crime rates. Changes in law enforcement policy over recent decades are discussed in light of the results.

本文考察了威胁惩罚犯罪者的可信度。动机是犯罪和惩罚的连续性，其展开如下：执法者威胁惩罚，犯罪者犯罪（或被威慑），执法者（可能由不同的决策者组成）实施惩罚。事后实施威胁惩罚的成本可能会破坏最初威胁的可信度。该模型表明，鉴于犯罪和惩罚博弈的连续性，多重均衡可能导致不同的犯罪率。根据结果​​讨论了近几十年来执法政策的变化。