The latest Russian regulatory reform (2016) sought to introduce the risk-orientated approach – a move away from the “blanket inspections” (or the risk regulation reflex – a term coined by Blanc in 2011) method that has been criticised by the Russian business community. The present paper aims to assess its success using administrative data on federal watchdogs’ inspections. We argue that this reform ultimately failed in its goal regarding the overall number of inspections, and thus the volume of regulatory burden did not change significantly throughout the reform. This failure resulted from two mechanisms. First, the legal framing of the reform radically redefined risk as the probability of incompliance (as opposed to the likelihood of accident). Second, the watchdogs used key performance indicators that incentivised “street-level” inspectors to maintain the pre-reform regulatory burden levels.

中文翻译：

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俄罗斯监管改革中的两个活动扳手

最新的俄罗斯监管改革（2016 年）试图引入以风险为导向的方法——摆脱受到俄罗斯企业批评的“全面检查”（或风险监管反射——Blanc 在 2011 年创造的术语）方法社区。本文件旨在使用联邦监管机构检查的行政数据评估其成功。我们认为，这项改革最终未能实现检查总数的目标，因此监管负担在整个改革过程中并未发生显着变化。这种失败是由两种机制造成的。首先，改革的法律框架从根本上将风险重新定义为不合规的可能性（而不是事故的可能性）。第二，