Transmission expansion is a complex problem in energy market design and research has not yet provided a market-based solution that is superior to a (partly) regulated approach. Furthermore, markets with a single market clearing price lack regional incentives for system friendly generation or transmission capacity expansion. In this paper, we propose a market design for transmission expansion that can be implemented in single-price markets with cost-based redispatch and we describe its properties. We show that our market solution is incentive compatible, satisfies the ’beneficiary pays’ requirement and leads to a welfare optimal grid expansion otherwise achieved by an integrated optimization approach of a benevolent grid operator. We apply the mechanism to the German electricity system in 2018, 2019 and 2030 as an example and show that transmission capacity expansion is greatly reduced using the mechanism instead of a no-congestion regulation. We also test the robustness of the approach to erroneous generation capacity expectations and find that the impact on economic results is limited. Finally, we extend our approach to include congestion reducing generation capacity investment and discuss the strategic effects on a 6-node reference grid.

输电扩张是能源市场设计中的一个复杂问题，研究尚未提供优于（部分）监管方法的基于市场的解决方案。此外，具有单一市场出清价格的市场缺乏系统友好发电或输电容量扩张的区域激励措施。在本文中，我们提出了一种传输扩展的市场设计，该设计可以在具有基于成本的再调度的单一价格市场中实施，并描述了其特性。我们表明我们的市场解决方案是激励兼容的，满足“受益人支付”的要求，并导致福利最优的电网扩张，否则通过仁慈电网运营商的综合优化方法实现。我们在2018年将该机制应用于德国电力系统，以 2019 年和 2030 年为例，表明使用该机制而不是无拥塞规则大大减少了传输容量扩展。我们还测试了错误发电容量预期方法的稳健性，发现对经济结果的影响是有限的。最后，我们将我们的方法扩展到包括减少拥堵的发电容量投资，并讨论对 6 节点参考电网的战略影响。