Resource adequacy in energy-only markets is of continual interest to policymakers and in Australia has historically been navigated via energy retailer investment commitments in peaking plant capacity. This in turn has been driven by the National Electricity Market's very high Market Price Cap (AUD $15,000/MWh). The market is rapidly transitioning with rising levels of renewables and coal plant closures. Ironically however, investment commitments in peaking plant capacity by major energy retailers has stalled. This raises the question as to whether the model of vertical integration, a pattern which dominated energy-only markets, has somehow broken down. In this article, peaking plant dynamics are tested using historic data – first as a stand-alone generator, then as part of a merged vertical entity over 16 years of trade. Results reveal the canonical merchant peaking plant remains too risky as a stand-alone project financing, but vertical integration and energy retailer incentives to commit to on-balance sheet peaking plant remains strong, with transaction cost synergies of 13% and investment grade credit quality being contingent on integration. Any lack of commitment must be explained by other variables.

政策制定者一直对能源市场的资源充足性感兴趣，而且澳大利亚历来通过能源零售商对工厂产能峰值的投资承诺进行导航。这反过来又受到国家电力市场极高的市场价格上限（15,000 澳元/MWh）的推动。随着可再生能源和燃煤电厂关闭水平的提高，市场正在迅速转变。然而，具有讽刺意味的是，主要能源零售商对提高工厂产能的投资承诺已经停滞。这就提出了一个问题，即垂直一体化模式，一种主导能源市场的模式，是否以某种方式崩溃了。在本文中，使用历史数据测试峰值工厂动态——首先作为一个独立的发电机，然后作为一个合并的垂直实体的一部分超过 16 年的贸易。结果显示，规范的商业调峰电厂作为独立项目融资的风险仍然过高，但垂直整合和能源零售商承诺投资资产负债表内调峰电厂的动力仍然强劲，交易成本协同效应为 13%，投资级信用质量为视整合而定。任何缺乏承诺都必须用其他变量来解释。