The Gettier dilemma facing reductive analyses of knowledge has not been properly appreciated by virtue epistemologists or even virtue epistemology’s most vocal critics. This paper starts by considering how recent critics of virtue epistemology understand the Gettier problem facing virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge. The paper highlights how the dilemma facing virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge is more general than these critics seem to suggest. It then elucidates the worry that the threat facing virtue epistemology is really a dilemma between Gettier counterexamples and radical skepticism. Finally, the paper considers how some recent virtue epistemologists have tried to viably defuse the Gettier problem. It shows (i) just how the critiques it elucidates have (mis)shaped the dialectic between virtue epistemology and what is required in solving Gettier counterexamples and (ii) how this has led to virtue epistemologists underestimating the widespread insidiousness of Gettier counterexamples.

中文翻译：

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美德认识论和盖蒂尔困境

美德认识论者甚至美德认识论最直言不讳的批评者都没有正确地认识到知识的还原分析所面临的盖蒂尔困境。本文首先考虑了最近美德认识论的批评者如何理解美德理论知识解释所面临的盖蒂尔问题。这篇论文强调了知识的美德理论分析所面临的困境比这些批评者似乎暗示的更为普遍。然后阐明了这样一种担忧，即美德认识论面临的威胁实际上是盖蒂尔反例和激进怀疑论之间的两难境地。最后，本文考虑了一些最近的美德认识论者如何试图有效地化解盖蒂尔问题。