This research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.

中文翻译：

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政变机构和民主前景

本研究报告介绍了有关军事政变的新全球数据。迄今为止，传统的汇总数据将两种不同类型的政变混为一谈。主要军官的军事干预是“从上而下”的政变，其特点是威权精英联盟内部的政治权力斗争，军官与平民精英、现任行政人员及其忠诚的安全人员展开对抗。相比之下，下层和中层军官的权力攫取是“自下而上”的政变，政治精英之外的军事人员挑战现任者、他们的忠诚者和政权本身。分解政变类型为修改有关军事干预政治的原因和后果的重要问题提供了杠杆作用。这份研究报告表明，军事等级最高层的政变企图比军事等级中下层的政变更有可能成功。此外，来自高层的政变重新调整了威权精英联盟，并有助于维持专制统治；它们很少为民主过渡提供机会。相比之下，来自下层的成功政变可能导致威权政权的崩溃，并为民主过渡创造机会。