The mothballing option has been studied in the literature, but mainly in decision theoretic frameworks. This paper looks at it from a strategic point of view and applies it to an incumbent-entrant framework. In particular, based on the recent strategic interactions between OPEC and the shale oil industry, we conduct a case study where the incumbent OPEC is a flexible producer that competes with a representative shale oil firm. Upon entry, the latter produces a fixed amount but it can apply the mothballing option in times of low demand.

Our main results are threefold. First, we find that under low demand uncertainty, the mothballing option has a negative effect on the value of the entrant. Second, a large market share of the entrant will stimulate mothballing, caused by a so-called squeeze strategy of the incumbent. Third, we show that a higher demand elasticity induces mothballing as confirmed in our empirical analysis of the (shale) oil market.

封存选项已在文献中进行了研究，但主要是在决策理论框架中。本文从战略角度对其进行了研究，并将其应用于现有-进入者框架。特别是，基于欧佩克和页岩油行业最近的战略互动，我们进行了一个案例研究，即现任欧佩克是一个灵活的生产商，与一家具有代表性的页岩油公司竞争。进入时，后者产生固定数量，但它可以在需求低的时候应用封存选项。

我们的主要结果是三方面的。首先，我们发现在低需求不确定性下，封存选项对进入者的价值有负面影响。其次，进入者的大量市场份额将刺激封存，这是由在位者的所谓挤压策略引起的。第三，正如我们对（页岩）石油市场的实证分析所证实的那样，我们表明更高的需求弹性会导致停产。