Financially constrained mortgage servicers destroyed substantial MBS investor value during the financial crisis through their management of delinquent mortgages. Servicers advance to investors monthly payments missed by borrowers. In order to minimize this obligation to extend financing to distressed borrowers, constrained servicers aggressively pursued foreclosures and modifications at the expense of investors, borrowers, and future mortgage performance. When agency frictions between the servicer and the investor are higher, the servicer’s financial constraints matter more. IV regressions suggest that, on average per defaulted loan, servicers’ financial constraints are responsible for 20% of the total investor value reduction during the financial crisis.

在金融危机期间，财务受限的抵押贷款服务商通过管理拖欠抵押贷款摧毁了 MBS 投资者的大量价值。服务商向投资者预付借款人错过的每月付款。为了尽量减少这种向陷入困境的借款人提供融资的义务，受限制的服务商以牺牲投资者、借款人和未来抵押贷款的表现为代价，积极追求止赎和修改。当服务商与投资者之间的代理摩擦越大时，服务商的财务约束就越重要。IV 回归表明，在金融危机期间，平均每笔违约贷款，服务商的财务约束造成了 20% 的投资者价值减少。