For two decades scholars have used insights from constructivist approaches and principal-agent (P-A) theory to understand the relationship between states and international organisations (IOs). Together, these works identify the conditions under which IOs can operate independently of states, although they have yet to explain when and why IO bureaucrats are likely to do so. Nor do they articulate a clear and consistent definition of autonomy. In this article, we seek to fill these gaps. We advance a narrow understanding of autonomy that distinguishes unintended behaviour from the intended independence of IO bureaucrats, before developing a three-stage, integrative explanation for the conditions under which IO bureaucrats act autonomously. First, we borrow from constructivist approaches a focus on staffing rules and the identity of IO bureaucrats to explain the sources of these agents’ preferences. Second, we add insights from work on exogenous pressures for change—crises and critical junctures—to explain when and why IO bureaucrats will advance their preferences. Third, we incorporate P-A theory’s attention to an IO’s institutional design, along with insights from literature on domestic institutions, to explain when bureaucrats can implement their preferences. Case studies of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) illustrate our argument.

二十年来，学者们利用建构主义方法和委托代理 (PA) 理论的见解来理解国家与国际组织 (IO) 之间的关系。这些作品共同确定了 IO 可以独立于国家运作的条件，尽管他们尚未解释 IO 官僚何时以及为何可能这样做。他们也没有明确和一致地定义自治。在本文中，我们试图填补这些空白。我们推进了对自治的狭隘理解，将无意行为与 IO 官僚的预期独立性区分开来，然后对 IO 官僚自主行动的条件进行了三个阶段的综合解释。第一的，我们借鉴了建构主义方法，重点关注人员配备规则和 IO 官僚的身份来解释这些代理人偏好的来源。其次，我们从关于变革的外生压力（危机和关键时刻）的工作中添加了见解，以解释 IO 官僚何时以及为何会推进他们的偏好。第三，我们将 PA 理论对 IO 制度设计的关注，以及对国内制度文献的见解，来解释官僚何时可以实施他们的偏好。世界卫生组织 (WHO) 和世界贸易组织 (WTO) 的案例研究说明了我们的论点。第三，我们将 PA 理论对 IO 制度设计的关注，以及对国内制度文献的见解，来解释官僚何时可以实施他们的偏好。世界卫生组织 (WHO) 和世界贸易组织 (WTO) 的案例研究说明了我们的论点。第三，我们将 PA 理论对 IO 制度设计的关注，以及对国内制度文献的见解，来解释官僚何时可以实施他们的偏好。世界卫生组织 (WHO) 和世界贸易组织 (WTO) 的案例研究说明了我们的论点。