To preserve democratic accountability, the actions of federal agencies remain subject to review by elected officials in the legislative and executive branches. Yet given the vast scope and complexity of the modern federal government, elected officials cannot possibly intervene in all agency matters. This leaves the courts to evaluate agency actions. Applying Rosenbloom’s separation of powers theory of public administration to Nagel’s theory of power as anticipated exchange, we expect that agencies become more judicialized in response to the courts’ influence. Leveraging novel data on personnel records, agency litigation, and policymaking from 1996 to 2016, we estimate regression models using ordinary least squares to provide an original and systematic account of the courts’ influence on agency personnel and professionalization. We find that agencies become more judicialized with increased exposure to the courts. Our dynamic comparison of the rise and fall of the number of judge-like policymakers within agencies highlights agency responses to judicial procedural preferences and suggests that federal agencies adopt personnel and processes that respond to the institutional perspectives of all three branches of government.

中文翻译：

---

预期裁决：美国行政州司法化分析

为了维护民主问责制，联邦机构的行动仍需接受立法和行政部门民选官员的审查。然而，鉴于现代联邦政府的庞大范围和复杂性，民选官员不可能干预所有机构事务。这使得法院可以评估机构的行动。将罗森布鲁姆的公共行政三权分立理论应用到内格尔的作为预期交换的权力理论中，我们预计机构会因法院的影响而变得更加司法化。利用 1996 年至 2016 年有关人事记录、机构诉讼和政策制定的新数据，我们使用普通最小二乘法估计回归模型，以提供法院对机构人员和专业化影响的原始和系统说明。我们发现，随着法院曝光度的增加，机构变得更加司法化。我们对机构内类似法官的政策制定者数量的动态比较突出了机构对司法程序偏好的反应，并建议联邦机构采用符合政府所有三个部门的制度观点的人员和流程。