Abstract

This paper attempts to answer the question “how do contract choices impact PPP performance?” It pursues an unusual approach by focusing on the contract attributes rather than the transaction attributes of the transaction cost economics’ framework. PPP performance is assessed by analyzing 157 Indian highways projects based on a unique set-up of two contract types. The paper employs the LOGIT and difference in difference techniques for empirical testing. Research findings exposit how varying intensity of contractual attributes can impact on the project outcomes, where contracts with tighter budget constraints could deliver better results in terms of lower cost and time overruns than its counterpart contracts. The paper also compares two contract regimes, which is marked by the modification and standardization of both contract types. This regime segregation allows the performance comparison within each contract type. The newer regime introduced more liberal and open-ended definitions without requisite incentives and checks. Change in definitions could achieve some semblance of lower probability of time overrun, but not the actual timely project completion. The empirical results explicate how modified definitions can produce misleading project outcomes. These research findings can help the policymakers to choose and design the contracts aligning with its contractual objectives.

摘要

本文试图回答“合同选择如何影响 PPP 绩效？”的问题。它通过关注合同属性而不是交易成本经济学框架的交易属性来追求一种不同寻常的方法。通过基于两种合同类型的独特设置分析 157 个印度高速公路项目来评估 PPP 绩效。本文采用LOGIT和差异技术进行实证检验。研究结果揭示了合同属性的不同强度如何影响项目结果，在预算约束更严格的合同中，与对应合同相比，在降低成本和时间超支方面可以提供更好的结果。本文还比较了两种合同制度，其特点是两种合同类型的修改和标准化。这种制度隔离允许在每种合同类型内进行绩效比较。新制度引入了更自由和开放的定义，没有必要的激励和检查。定义的改变可能会降低时间超限的可能性，但不会实际及时完成项目。实证结果说明了修改后的定义如何产生误导性的项目结果。这些研究结果可以帮助政策制定者选择和设计符合其合同目标的合同。但不是实际按时完成的项目。实证结果说明了修改后的定义如何产生误导性的项目结果。这些研究结果可以帮助政策制定者选择和设计符合其合同目标的合同。但不是实际按时完成的项目。实证结果说明了修改后的定义如何产生误导性的项目结果。这些研究结果可以帮助政策制定者选择和设计符合其合同目标的合同。