States signal their intentions to domestic and foreign audiences but are not always believed. Why do people believe some state signals but not others? Using a survey experiment on a representative sample of the US public, this study finds that individuals have a negativity bias when assessing the credibility of state signals. They take other states’ aggressive actions as evidence of deep hostility but are skeptical of the credibility of conciliatory gestures. The experimental result shows that the mobilization of a small proportion of an army is perceived credible enough as an aggressive action, while the removal of even a large proportion is not perceived as conciliatory. The psychological mechanism found here is a strong foundation for theorizing about how individuals process information embedded in state signals and can improve our understanding of signaling.

各国向国内外观众表明了他们的意图，但并不总是被相信。为什么人们相信某些状态信号而不相信其他信号？本研究使用对美国公众代表性样本的调查实验，发现个人在评估国家信号的可信度时存在消极偏见。他们将其他国家的侵略行为视为深刻敌意的证据，但对和解姿态的可信度持怀疑态度。实验结果表明，动员一小部分军队被认为是一种攻击性行动足够可信，而即使撤除大部分军队也不会被认为是一种和解。