We document that networks that gain access to political power and use it for patronage appointments also gain control over resource allocation in the private sector. Specifically, following a presidential election in Korea, the president appoints members of his network into important positions in government, and private banks respond by appointing executives from the same network to establish links to the administration. Consequently, firms linked to the network obtain more credit at a lower rate from government and private banks alike, despite higher default rates. Micro-level data on loans and variation in network links for the same firm across lenders over time sharpen the interpretation of our results. In a parsimonious model, we show that efficiency costs are higher when government and private banks are controlled by the same group rather than different groups: in-group firms invest in more unprofitable projects, whereas out-group firms lack funding for highly profitable investments.

我们记录了获得政治权力并将其用于赞助任命的网络也可以控制私营部门的资源分配。具体而言，在韩国总统选举之后，总统任命其网络成员担任政府的重要职位，而私人银行则通过任命同一网络的高管来与政府建立联系来做出回应。因此，尽管违约率较高，但与网络相关的公司以较低的利率从政府和私人银行获得更多信贷。随着时间的推移，同一家公司在不同贷方之间的贷款微观数据和网络链接的变化增强了对我们结果的解释。在简约模型中，