Is there an exception to the principle of full reparation in international investment arbitration for cases in which full compensation is crippling for the responsible State or its peoples? The routine presentation and consideration of billion-dollar-plus investment arbitration claims in the first half of 2021 suggests that this subject has not been invented in order to enable it to be written about but is one of considerable importance for the field of international investment law and its actors. The frame of reference in a discussion about compensation in investment law is provided by the law of State responsibility, strongly shaped by the 2001 International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility), which treat crippling compensation as permissible as a matter of content of responsibility. The argument for the permissibility of crippling compensation explicitly assumed the rarity of such claims; safeguards in primary, secondary, and tertiary rules for the few cases when they did arise; and the enlightened self-interest of States as repeat-playing actors in not making them—and perhaps implicitly scepticism about compound interest and Discount Cash Flow valuation. None of these assumptions holds true in modern investor State arbitration. Nevertheless, the predominant reaction to crippling compensation claims has been silence by tribunals and respondent States, suggestive in legal terms of endorsement of their permissibility in line with the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility. There is some scope for addressing crippling compensation within the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, both indirectly (challenging the meaningfulness of the question in the first place or considering crippling compensation as part of the general discussion of the content of responsibility) and directly, under the rubrics of circumstances precluding wrongfulness and enforcement. The case can also be made for moving beyond the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, by emphasising the difference between implementation of responsibility in inter-State and investor–State legal relations or even directly arguing for a change of the applicable customary rule.

中文翻译：

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国际法委员会的严重赔偿和投资者-国家仲裁

在全额赔偿对责任国或其人民造成严重损害的情况下，国际投资仲裁中的全额赔偿原则是否存在例外情况？2021 年上半年超过 10 亿美元的投资仲裁索赔的例行陈述和审议表明，这一主题并不是为了使其能够被撰写而发明的，而是对于国际投资法领域具有相当重要意义的主题之一及其演员。投资法中关于赔偿的讨论的参考框架由国家责任法提供，该法受到 2001 年国际法委员会关于国家对国际不法行为的责任的条款（2001 年 ILC 国家责任条款）的强烈影响，将致残性赔偿视为责任内容是允许的。允许严重损害赔偿的论据明确假设此类索赔很少见；为少数确实出现的情况提供初级、二级和三级规则的保障措施；以及国家作为重复参与者不制造它们的开明的自身利益——也许暗含对复利和贴现现金流估值的怀疑。这些假设在现代投资者国家仲裁中都不成立。然而，对严重的赔偿要求的主要反应是法庭和被告国保持沉默，这在法律上暗示了根据 2001 年国际劳工大会关于国家责任的条款认可他们的许可。在 2001 年国际法委员会关于国家责任的条款中，有一些解决严重补偿的空间，包括间接（首先挑战问题的意义或将严重补偿作为对责任内容的一般性讨论的一部分）和直接，根据排除不法性和强制执行的情况的标准。也可以通过强调国家间法律关系和投资者-国家法律关系中责任履行之间的区别，甚至直接主张改变适用的习惯规则，超越 2001 年 ILC 国家责任条款。间接地（首先挑战问题的意义或考虑将严重的赔偿作为对责任内容的一般性讨论的一部分）和直接地，在排除不法性和强制执行的情况下。也可以通过强调国家间法律关系和投资者-国家法律关系中责任履行之间的区别，甚至直接主张改变适用的习惯规则，超越 2001 年 ILC 国家责任条款。间接地（首先挑战问题的意义或考虑将严重的赔偿作为对责任内容的一般性讨论的一部分）和直接地，在排除不法性和强制执行的情况下。也可以通过强调国家间法律关系和投资者-国家法律关系中责任履行之间的区别，甚至直接主张改变适用的习惯规则，超越 2001 年 ILC 国家责任条款。