ABSTRACT

This article documents elements of COVID-19-inspired company legislation on digital participation of shareholders in general meetings in 22 countries and analyses to what extent such legislation can function as a blueprint for law reform. Lawmakers need to strike a balance between ensuring a smooth general meeting (from management's perspective) and protecting shareholders' rights. COVID-19 legislation with regard to shareholder interventions has lacked this balance. Further, crisis legislation, adopted in haste as it was, could not reflect the fundamental shift towards institutionalized shareholdings. Once adopted, there is a risk that the hasty choices made during COVID times will stick, resulting in suboptimal regulation of shareholder meetings. The crisis legislation on meetings should thus be revisited, reflecting three paradigm shifts in corporate governance, namely the form of the meeting (virtual instead of in-person), its temporal dimension (multi-day process instead of a specific meeting day), and the institutionalisation of ownership, which allows investors to deploy resources and technology unavailable to most individuals.

摘要

本文记录了 22 个国家受 COVID-19 启发的关于股东数字参与股东大会的公司立法的要素，并分析了此类立法在多大程度上可以作为法律改革的蓝图。立法者需要在确保顺利召开股东大会（从管理层的角度）和保护股东权利之间取得平衡。关于股东干预的 COVID-19 立法缺乏这种平衡。此外，仓促通过的危机立法无法反映向制度化持股的根本转变。一旦被采纳，在 COVID 时期做出的仓促选择可能会持续下去，从而导致对股东大会的监管不理想。因此，应重新审视有关会议的危机立法，