Abstract

Analyses of constitutional conventions tend not to include those conventions that concern relations between the judiciary and other arms of government. The focus is generally on the conventions concerning the monarch, executive and legislature. This article argues that a study of the constitutional conventions relating to the judiciary reveals three insights about the nature of constitutional conventions and the nature of the judiciary. First, significant aspects of the judiciary’s authority, independence and impartiality are often secured by means of constitutional convention. Second, these conventions help understand the simultaneous strength and fragility of the judiciary’s constitutional position. Third, they highlight that, contrary to suggestions in the literature on democratic decay, it is not always problematic for constitutional conventions to be modified or even destroyed. To illustrate these insights, the article compares the executive’s duty to defend the judiciary from public attack in Australia, the UK and the United States.

中文翻译：

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制宪会议和司法机构

摘要

对宪法公约的分析往往不包括那些涉及司法机构与政府其他部门之间关系的公约。重点通常是关于君主、行政和立法机关的公约。本文认为，对与司法有关的制宪会议的研究揭示了关于宪法会议性质和司法机构性质的三个见解。首先，司法机关的权威性、独立性和公正性的重要方面通常是通过制宪会议来确保的。其次，这些惯例有助于理解司法机构宪法地位同时具有的力量和脆弱性。第三，他们强调，与文献中关于民主衰退的建议相反，修改甚至摧毁制宪公约并不总是有问题。为了说明这些见解，本文比较了澳大利亚、英国和美国的行政部门保护司法机构免受公众攻击的责任。