We consider cooperatives games (TU-games) enriched by a system of a priori unions and a communication forest graph which are independent from each other. These two structures reflect the limitations of cooperation possibilities. In this framework, we introduce four Owen-type allocation rules, which are defined by a two-step application of an allocation rule à la Owen (in: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, 1977) to TU-games with a priori unions where the TU-game is replaced by Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) graph-restricted TU-game. The four possibilities arise by applying, at each step, either the Myerson value (Myerson 1977) or the average tree solution (Herings et al. in Games Econ Behav 62:77–92, 2008). Our main result offers comparable axiomatizations of these four allocation rules.

我们考虑由相互独立的先验联合系统和通信森林图丰富的合作博弈（TU-games）。这两种结构反映了合作可能性的局限性。在这个框架中，我们引入了四个 Owen 类型的分配规则，它们是由 Owen 中的分配规则的两步应用定义的（在：Henn R，Moeschlin O（eds）数理经济学和博弈论中的论文，Springer， Berlin, 1977) 到具有先验联合的 TU 游戏，其中 TU 游戏被 Myerson 的 (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) 图形限制的 TU 游戏取代。通过在每一步应用 Myerson 值（Myerson 1977）或平均树解决方案（Herings 等人，在 Games Econ Behav 62:77–92, 2008 中），会产生四种可能性。