ABSTRACT

The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals’ strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an “insurance policy,” reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995–2010. We find that in 42% of the conflicts, the arrival of the mediator was significantly associated with increased hostilities. We discuss this pattern and examine factors that might be linked to its occurrence.

摘要

国际关系文献通常将调解员描述为争端缓和的有效代理人。在调解开始后，竞争对手预计将降低冲突的火焰并进入谈判。然而，我们认为，调解人的存在实际上可能会促使和促进冲突升级，尤其是在调解开始之后。敌对行动可能是由竞争对手发出决心信号的战略需求所激发的，但可能会因相信调解人将遏制报复行动而进一步激化。从这个意义上说，调解员被视为一种“保险政策”，从而降低了升级的可能性和潜在成本。为了探索这一现象，我们跟踪了 1995 年至 2010 年州内冲突调解开始后六个月内竞争对手的行为模式。我们发现，在 42% 的冲突中，调解人的到来与敌对行动的增加显着相关。我们讨论了这种模式并检查了可能与其发生有关的因素。