Can private companies legitimately regulate sharing markets, and if yes, how? Whereas scholars have either criticized sharing platforms for expanding into private and public arenas or welcomed them to counterbalance encroaching government regulations, studies document their unbridled popularity. On the basis of a special version of social contracts theory pioneered by James Buchanan, we develop a heuristics that helps guide reasoning about the legitimacy of the sharing economy’s regulatory function. First, we discuss the conditions under which free and responsible individuals deliberately subject themselves to rules without their prior direct participation, that is, exit, voice, and constitutional limits. Second, we suggest sharing platforms can use novel ordo-responsibilities to establish a sharing constitution that takes these conditions into account. Third, we argue that sharing platforms can legitimately do so within an enabling institutional environment in society, the provision of which relies on the joint efforts of sharing platforms, political actors, and civil society.

私营公司能否合法监管共享市场，如果可以，如何监管？尽管学者们要么批评共享平台扩展到私人和公共领域，要么欢迎它们来平衡日益严重的政府法规，但研究记录了它们肆无忌惮的受欢迎程度。在詹姆斯·布坎南（James Buchanan）开创的特殊版本的社会契约理论的基础上，我们开发了一种启发式方法，有助于指导对共享经济监管功能合法性的推理。首先，我们讨论了自由和负责任的个人在没有事先直接参与的情况下故意使自己服从规则的条件，即退出、发言权和宪法限制。第二，我们建议共享平台可以使用新的秩序职责来建立一个考虑到这些条件的共享章程。第三，我们认为共享平台可以在社会有利的制度环境中合法地这样做，其提供依赖于共享平台、政治行为者和公民社会的共同努力。