The principle of in dubio mitius stipulates that if treaty interpreters have doubts about the correct meaning of a provision, they should adopt the interpretation that imposes the less demanding obligation. Although the principle is commonly rejected by scholars, it keeps surfacing in international legal practice. This article describes the history of the principle and provides an overview of its treatment by international courts and tribunals. It then argues that in dubio mitius can be of renewed relevance, now that the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals has become increasingly controversial. The principle recognizes that some questions of treaty interpretation may not have a single permissible answer, even after an application of the customary rules of treaty interpretation, and instead allow for legitimate disagreement or ‘doubt’. In such circumstances, in dubio mitius provides treaty interpreters with a solution, advising them to limit the scope of vague provisions to a normative core that can be deduced with sufficient certainty. In doing so, the principle acknowledges that international courts and tribunals lack the authority to expand international law in the face of legitimate disagreement within and among states.

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在 Dubio Mitius：促进条约解释的清晰和谦虚

in dubio mitius 原则规定，如果条约解释者对条款的正确含义有疑问，应采用要求不高的解释。尽管这一原则被学者们普遍否定，但它在国际法律实践中不断浮出水面。本文描述了该原则的历史，并概述了国际法院和法庭对其的处理。然后它争辩说，由于国际法院和法庭的合法性变得越来越有争议，因此在 dubio mitius 中可能具有新的相关性。该原则承认，即使在适用条约解释的习惯规则之后，某些条约解释问题也可能没有一个允许的答案，而是允许合法的分歧或“怀疑”。在这种情况下，in dubio mitius 为条约解释者提供了解决方案，建议他们将模糊条款的范围限制在可以充分确定地推断的规范核心。在这样做时，该原则承认，面对国家内部和国家之间的合法分歧，国际法院和法庭缺乏扩展国际法的权力。