Our aim is to provide an account of constitutive rules in terms of (1) the acceptance of regulative norms, and (2) a cognitive process we call “symbolization” (in an altogether different sense from what J. R. Searle means by this word). We claim, first, that institutional facts à la Searle boil down to facts concerning the collective acceptance of regulative norms in a given community. This, however, does not exhaust what institutional facts are. There is a residue, symbolization. Symbolization, as we understand it, involves a transfer of cognitive models from one domain to another. We introduce this notion by exploring different sorts of games, taking our cue from games of pretend play. In the context of this exploration, we introduce the idea of the significance—a matter of degree—of symbolization for a given institutional concept. In particular, we claim, symbolization may play, vis-à-vis a given institutional concept, a properly constitutive or a merely auxiliary role. We further argue that, in most legal concepts as conceived in our legal culture, symbolization plays a merely auxiliary role. A possible exception is the concept of political representation, at least on some understandings of it.

中文翻译：

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构成规则：符号化帐户

我们的目标是根据以下方面提供对构成规则的说明：（1）对规范性规范的接受，以及（2）我们称之为“符号化”的认知过程（与 JR Searle 所说的这个词的含义完全不同）。首先，我们声称制度事实Searle 归结为关于在特定社区中集体接受监管规范的事实。然而，这并没有穷尽制度性事实。有一个残留，象征。正如我们所理解的，符号化涉及认知模型从一个领域到另一个领域的转移。我们通过探索不同类型的游戏来引入这一概念，并从假装游戏中汲取灵感。在这一探索的背景下，我们引入了符号化对于给定制度概念的意义（程度问题）的概念。特别是，我们声称，符号化可以发挥作用，相对于一个给定的制度概念，一个适当的构成或仅仅是一个辅助角色。我们进一步认为，在我们的法律文化中所构想的大多数法律概念中，符号化只是起到辅助作用。一个可能的例外是政治代表的概念，至少在对它的某些理解上是这样。