In this article, I critically examine a number of widely held beliefs about the nature of replication and its place in science, with particular reference to psychology. In doing so, I present a number of underappreciated understandings of the nature of science more generally. I contend that some contributors to the replication debates overstate the importance of replication in science and mischaracterize the relationship between direct and conceptual replication. I also claim that there has been a failure to appreciate sufficiently the variety of legitimate replication practices that scientists engage in. In this regard, I highlight the tendency to pay insufficient attention to methodological triangulation as an important strategy for justifying empirical claims. I argue, further, that the replication debates tend to overstate the closeness of the relationship between replication and theory construction. Some features of this relationship are spelt out with reference to the hypothetico-deductive and the abductive accounts of scientific method. Additionally, an evaluation of the status of replication in different characterizations of scientific progress is undertaken. I maintain that viewing replication as just one element of the wide array of scientific endeavors leads to the conclusion that it is not as prominent in science as is often claimed.

在这篇文章中，我批判性地研究了一些广泛持有的关于复制的性质及其在科学中的地位的信念，特别是心理学。在这样做的过程中，我提出了一些更普遍的对科学本质的未被充分理解的理解。我认为，复制辩论的一些贡献者夸大了复制在科学中的重要性，并错误地描述了直接复制和概念复制之间的关系。我还声称，一直未能充分理解科学家所从事的各种合法复制实践。在这方面，我强调了对方法学三角测量作为证明经验主张合理性的重要策略不够重视的趋势。我进一步论证说，复制辩论倾向于夸大复制与理论构建之间的密切关系。参考科学方法的假设-演绎和溯因说明，阐明了这种关系的一些特征。此外，还对科学进步的不同特征中的复制状态进行了评估。我坚持认为复制只是广泛科学努力中的一个要素，因此得出的结论是它在科学中并不像人们经常声称的那样突出。对科学进步的不同特征中的复制状况进行了评估。我坚持认为复制只是广泛科学努力中的一个要素，因此得出的结论是它在科学中并不像人们经常声称的那样突出。对科学进步的不同特征中的复制状况进行了评估。我坚持认为复制只是广泛科学努力中的一个要素，因此得出的结论是它在科学中并不像人们经常声称的那样突出。