In this paper, we aim to analyse the role of shareholders in the creation of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) and the use of LLP in income smoothing. Using a sample of over 200 Central European banks, we demonstrate that LLP and income smoothing of foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks differ from those of domestic private banks. Foreign and state banks create higher discretionary LLP than private domestic banks. Foreign banks use these LLP to perform discretionary income smoothing, while state banks, in general, do not smooth income. Higher LLP of foreign banks are observed in banks with low asset quality and high profitability. Foreign banks with low profitability that operate in volatile economic environments do not create higher discretionary LLP than domestic private banks. This implies that their risk is not lower than that of locally owned banks, at least on the credit side. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, both foreign and state banks have become more prudent than domestic private banks, and their discretionary LLP are higher. Overall, we provide evidence that foreign and government ownership affect LLP policy in banks. This complements existing results on the differences in loan cyclicality and default risk between foreign, state and domestic private banks.

在本文中，我们旨在分析股东在创建酌情贷款损失准备金 (LLP) 中的作用以及 LLP 在收入平滑中的使用。我们使用 200 多家中欧银行的样本，证明了外资银行和国有银行的 LLP 和收入平滑与国内私人银行不同。外国银行和国有银行比私人国内银行创造了更高的全权委托 LLP。外国银行使用这些 LLP 进行可自由支配的收入平滑，而国有银行一般不会平滑收入。在资产质量低、盈利能力高的银行中，外资银行的 LLP 较高。在动荡的经济环境中运营的盈利能力低的外国银行不会产生比国内私人银行更高的全权委托 LLP。这意味着它们的风险不低于本地银行，至少在信贷方面是这样。金融危机后，外资银行和国有银行都比国内私人银行更加审慎，全权委托LLP也更高。总体而言，我们提供证据表明外国和政府所有权影响银行的 LLP 政策。这补充了关于外国、国有和国内私人银行之间贷款周期和违约风险差异的现有结果。