Individual selection, as an effective mechanism, is often used in spatial evolutionary games to promote cooperation. Previous research assumes that, individual selection usually occurs with people who fail to meet a certain criterion. However, individual selection is usually inevitable, regardless of whether players in population cooperate or defect. This paper studies the effects of wealth-based rule in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable. Specifically, we assume that only the top V individuals with relatively high cumulative payoffs in each group can be selected for costly PGG. The results show that when V is large, the increase of participation cost has slight inhibitory effects on the evolution of cooperation, but it alleviates the polarization of individuals. However, when V is small, the increase of participation cost within a certain range promotes cooperation prosperity, but it also causes an increase in the proportion of polarized individuals and a widening of the wealth gap between rich and poor individuals.

个体选择作为一种有效机制，常用于空间演化博弈中促进合作。先前的研究假设，个体选择通常发生在不符合某个标准的人身上。然而，个体选择通常是不可避免的，无论群体中的玩家是合作还是叛逃。本文研究了当个体选择不可避免时，基于财富的规则在代价高昂的公共产品博弈中的影响。具体来说，我们假设只有每组中累积收益相对较高的前V 个个体才能被选为代价高昂的 PGG。结果表明，当V大，参与成本的增加对合作的演化有轻微的抑制作用，但缓解了个体的两极分化。但是，当V较小时，一定范围内参与成本的增加促进了合作的繁荣，但同时也造成了两极分化个体比例的增加和贫富差距的扩大。