Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit (Nachman and Noe, 1994)’s adverse selection setting, modeling capital market competition as free entry of investors and allowing firms to propose prices for their securities, as happens in private securities placements and bank lending. We identify equilibria in which high types issue underpriced debt, which yields positive expected profits to uninformed lenders, while low types issue steeper securities, such as equity. In addition, pooling equilibria exist in which all firms issue underpriced debt. Introducing pre-existing capital structures provides further foundations for pecking-order theories of external finance.

经典的证券设计论文将竞争性资本市场等同于预期中的证券定价合理。我们重新审视（Nachman 和 Noe，1994）的逆向选择设置，将资本市场竞争建模为投资者的自由进入并允许公司为其证券提出价格，就像私人证券配售和银行借贷一样。我们确定了均衡，其中高类型发行定价过低的债务，为不知情的贷方带来正的预期利润，而低类型发行更陡峭的证券，例如股票。此外，存在汇集均衡，其中所有公司发行定价过低的债务。引入预先存在的资本结构为外部融资的优先级理论提供了进一步的基础。