A large theoretical literature studies the effects of creditor control during bankruptcy proceedings on firm outcomes. Empirical work in this area mainly examines reforms to creditor control rights during liquidation. In this paper, we use administrative microdata and exploit a legal reform in Denmark to provide the first causal estimates of creditor empowerment in reorganization-the complementary bankruptcy procedure to liquidation. We find that the Danish reform led to a sharp decline in liquidations. Although few insolvent firms make use of the new reorganization procedures, we show that solvent firms improved their financial management and increased employment and investment. The findings illustrate the empirical importance of reorganization rules on the incentives of stakeholders outside of bankruptcy.

大量理论文献研究了破产程序中债权人控制对公司结果的影响。该领域的实证工作主要研究清算期间债权人控制权的改革。在本文中，我们使用行政微观数据并利用丹麦的一项法律改革来提供重组中债权人授权的第一个因果估计 - 清算的补充破产程序。我们发现丹麦的改革导致清算量急剧下降。尽管很少有资不抵债的公司使用新的重组程序，但我们表明，有偿付能力的公司改善了财务管理并增加了就业和投资。研究结果说明了重组规则对破产以外利益相关者激励的实证重要性。