This article presents a challenge that those philosophers who deny the causal interpretation of explanations provided by population genetics might have to address. Indeed, some philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and support the causal interpretation of natural selection. The problem I am concerned with here arises for the statisticalists because the debate on the nature of natural selection intersects the debate on whether mathematical explanations of empirical facts are genuine scientific explanations. I argue that if the explanations provided by population genetics are regarded by the statisticalists as non-causal explanations of that kind, then statisticalism risks being incompatible with a naturalist stance. The statisticalist faces a dilemma: either she maintains statisticalism but has to renounce naturalism; or she maintains naturalism but has to content herself with an account of the explanations provided by population genetics that she deems unsatisfactory. This challenge is relevant to the statisticalists because many of them see themselves as naturalists.

本文提出了一个挑战，那些否认群体遗传学提供的解释的因果解释的哲学家可能必须解决这个挑战。事实上，一些被称为统计学家的哲学家声称，自然选择的概念在性质上是统计性的，不能用因果关系来解释。相反，其他被称为因果论者的哲学家反对统计观点并支持自然选择的因果解释。我在这里关心的问题出现在统计学家身上，因为关于自然选择本质的争论与关于经验事实的数学解释是否是真正的科学解释的争论相交。我认为，如果统计学家认为群体遗传学提供的解释是非因果解释，那么统计主义就有与自然主义立场不相容的风险。统计学家面临两难选择：要么坚持统计主义，要么放弃自然主义；或者她坚持自然主义，但不得不满足于她认为不能令人满意的群体遗传学提供的解释。这一挑战与统计学家有关，因为他们中的许多人认为自己是博物学家。或者她坚持自然主义，但不得不满足于她认为不能令人满意的群体遗传学提供的解释。这一挑战与统计学家有关，因为他们中的许多人认为自己是博物学家。或者她坚持自然主义，但不得不满足于她认为不能令人满意的群体遗传学提供的解释。这一挑战与统计学家有关，因为他们中的许多人认为自己是博物学家。