Few questions in science are as controversial as human nature. At stake is whether our basic concepts and emotions are all learned from experience, or whether some are innate. Here, I demonstrate that reasoning about innateness is biased by the basic workings of the human mind. Psychological science suggests that newborns possess core concepts of “object” and “number.” Laypeople, however, believe that newborns are devoid of such notions but that they can recognize emotions. Moreover, people presume that concepts are learned, whereas emotions (along with sensations and actions) are innate. I trace these beliefs to two tacit psychological principles: intuitive dualism and essentialism. Essentialism guides tacit reasoning about biological inheritance and suggests that innate traits reside in the body; per intuitive dualism, however, the mind seems ethereal, distinct from the body. It thus follows that, in our intuitive psychology, concepts (which people falsely consider as disembodied) must be learned, whereas emotions, sensations, and emotions (which are considered embodied) are likely innate; these predictions are in line with the experimental results. These conclusions do not speak to the question of whether concepts and emotions are innate, but they suggest caution in its scientific evaluation.

科学中很少有问题像人性一样具有争议性。关键在于我们的基本概念和情感是否都是从经验中习得的，或者是否有些是与生俱来的。在这里，我证明了关于先天性的推理受到人类思维基本运作方式的影响。心理科学表明，新生儿拥有“物体”和“数字”的核心概念。然而，外行人认为，新生儿没有这种观念，但他们可以识别情绪。此外，人们认为概念是后天习得的，而情感（以及感觉和行动）是与生俱来的。我将这些信念追溯到两个默认的心理学原则：直觉二元论和本质主义。本质主义指导关于生物遗传的隐性推理，并表明先天特征存在于身体中。然而，根据直觉二元论，心灵似乎是空灵的，与身体不同。因此，在我们的直觉心理学中，概念（人们错误地认为是无实体的）必须是后天习得的，而情绪、感觉和情感（被认为是有实体的）很可能是与生俱来的。这些预测与实验结果相符。这些结论并没有涉及概念和情感是否是与生俱来的问题，但它们建议对其进行科学评估时要谨慎。