I argue that Kroedel's 'Simple Argument' for downward causation fails and that this failure has consequences for any attempt to establish the reality of downward causation by appealing to counterfactual theories thereof. A central premise in Kroedel's argument equivocates. On one reading, it is true but renders the argument invalid; on another, it renders the argument valid but is likely false. I dedicate most of my efforts to establishing the second of these two claims. I show that the purported physical effects of mental properties do not counterfactually depend upon the total realizers of these properties. If counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation, it follows that mental properties are not causes. If counterfactual dependence is merely sufficient for causation, it follows that no appeal to counterfactuals will by itself succeed in showing that mental properties are causes.

中文翻译：

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向下因果关系的简单论证中的模棱两可

我认为 Kroedel 对向下因果关系的“简单论证”失败了，并且这种失败对任何试图通过诉诸其反事实理论来建立向下因果关系现实的尝试都有影响。Kroedel 论证中的一个中心前提模棱两可。乍一看，它是正确的，但会使论点无效；另一方面，它使论点有效，但可能是错误的。我将大部分精力用于建立这两个主张中的第二个。我表明，心理属性的所谓物理效应并不反事实地依赖于这些属性的全部实现者。如果因果关系需要反事实依赖，那么心理属性不是原因。如果反事实依赖仅足以产生因果关系，