In this paper, we study the effect of competition on the plural dimensions of hospital quality in a market with regulated prices. Our results are obtained with the standard model of hospital competition where a distinction can now be made between two different dimensions of quality while using fair general demand and cost structure. In our setting, hospitals can choose to invest either in the quality of health care services which reduces exposition to the risk of medical error, or in another dimension of quality which is independent to the risk of medical malpractice (appropriateness, patient-centeredness, amenities, etc.). We derive the conditions under which an intensified competition can not only raise or decrease hospital quality, but can also lead to a substitution between the two dimensions of quality. We also investigate how hospital competition and tort law may interact to help improve quality of care by deterring negligent behaviors of providers of care. Lastly, we use a model of strategic pretrial negotiation under asymmetric information to examine the effect of hospital competition on the resolution of medical disputes through its effect on quality.

在本文中，我们研究了在价格受到管制的市场中竞争对医院质量的多个维度的影响。我们的结果是通过医院竞争的标准模型获得的，现在可以在使用公平的一般需求和成本结构的同时区分质量的两个不同维度。在我们的环境中，医院可以选择投资于降低医疗错误风险的医疗保健服务质量，或者投资于独立于医疗事故风险的另一个质量维度（适当性、以患者为中心、便利设施） ， 等等。）。我们推导出激烈的竞争不仅可以提高或降低医院质量的条件，而且还可以导致质量的两个维度之间的替代。我们还调查了医院竞争和侵权法如何相互作用，通过阻止护理提供者的疏忽行为来帮助提高护理质量。最后，我们使用信息不对称下的审前战略谈判模型，通过对质量的影响来考察医院竞争对医疗纠纷解决的影响。