It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states (new pragmatism); or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons (traditional pragmatism). I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go.

人们常常认为，有信仰的，因为我们不相信没有实际理由对这样的理由。实用主义者最近的回答是，我们经常可以出于实际原因而相信，因为我们经常可以出于实际原因而导致我们的信念。本文揭示了这种最近流行的为实用主义辩护的策略的局限性，从而重塑了实用主义的辩证选择。我认为该策略的前提是处于非故意状态的原因不能还原为采取行动的原因。因此，想要保留对原因的动机约束的实用主义者恰好有两种选择：要么认为存在不可简化的原因处于非故意状态（新实用主义）；或争辩说我们可以直接相信出于实际原因（传统实用主义）。我认为前一种选择的前景是暗淡的，因为进入状态的不可减少的理由很难与理由的动机约束相一致。因此，通过捍卫一种信仰自愿主义的版本，回到更传统的为实用主义辩护的路线，似乎是实用主义者更有希望走的路。