A fundamental question in responsibility theory concerns the relation between being responsible and our practices of holding responsible. ‘Strawsonians’ often claim that being responsible is somehow a function of our practices of holding responsible, while others think that holding responsible depends on being responsible, and still others think of being and holding responsible as interdependent. Based on a Wittgensteinian reading of Strawson, I develop an account of the relation between being and holding responsible which respects major concerns of all parties in this debate. I characterize the way in which being responsible depends on holding responsible as genealogical, and the way in which holding responsible depends on being responsible as justificatory. I show how my account cuts across received ways of carving up the debate, and how it allows for all the kinds of fallibility about moral responsibility that are worth wanting.

责任理论中的一个基本问题涉及负责任与我们承担责任的实践之间的关系。“斯特劳森主义者”经常声称，在某种程度上，负责任是我们承担责任实践的一种功能，而另一些人则认为承担责任取决于承担责任，还有一些人认为承担责任和承担责任是相互依存的。基于维特根斯坦对斯特劳森的阅读，我对承担责任和承担责任之间的关系进行了说明，这尊重了这场辩论中所有各方的主要关切。我将责任取决于作为谱系的承担责任 的方式，以及承担责任取决于作为正当理由的责任的方式。 . 我展示了我的叙述如何跨越了现有的划分辩论的方式，以及它如何允许所有值得想要的道德责任的错误。