The regulatory protection of credit consumers, in general, is paramount due to the considerable use of credit, the imbalanced bargaining positions of the contracting parties and the adverse effect of over-indebtedness on individuals and society alike. These concerning factors are worsened in the case of High-Cost Short-Term Credit (HCSTC) consumers owing to their disadvantaged financial position and other recognised vulnerabilities. In this respect, the paper argues that direct regulatory intervention, despite its importance, is not always a silver bullet. Through the analysis of the overhauling of the UK HCSTC regulatory framework, this paper demonstrates the shortfalls of these regulatory changes. Accordingly, the paper shifts the argument towards improving the decision-making mechanisms of HCSTC consumers, ie the role of ‘libertarian paternalism’-based interventions. By using a bespoke experimental survey, the paper demonstrates the type of behavioural interventions that can assist in this endeavour and which the regulator could possibly mandate.

由于信贷的大量使用、合同各方的不平衡谈判地位以及过度负债对个人和社会的不利影响，一般而言，对信贷消费者的监管保护至关重要。在高成本短期信贷 (HCSTC) 消费者的情况下，由于财务状况不利和其他公认的脆弱性，这些相关因素更加严重。在这方面，该论文认为，直接监管干预尽管很重要，但并不总是灵丹妙药。本文通过对英国 HCSTC 监管框架改革的分析，论证了这些监管变革的不足之处。因此，本文将论点转向改善 HCSTC 消费者的决策机制，即“自由主义家长制”干预的作用。通过使用定制的实验调查，该论文展示了可以帮助这一努力的行为干预类型，以及监管机构可能强制执行的行为干预类型。