Much work has examined the phenomenon of dispute escalation, whereby the concrete measures state actors take edge them closer to war. Less attention has been devoted to the ways in which state actors’ perceptions of what is at stake in a dispute can also change, with important consequences for the likelihood of conflict. This paper examines the phenomenon of dispute inflation – wherein a contest over an object or issue assumes ever greater stakes and significance for its protagonists – and identifies three different mechanisms that can generate increasing non-material stakes. The upshot is that theoretically even a minor dispute can grow into a major conflict due to swelling stakes, especially when dispute inflation spirals. To illustrate these dynamics at work, this paper looks to recent developments in the dispute between the People’s Republic of China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

许多工作研究了争端升级的现象，即国家行为者采取的具体措施使他们更接近战争。较少关注国家行为者对争端中利害关系的看法也可能发生变化的方式，从而对冲突的可能性产生重要影响。本文考察了争议膨胀的现象——其中围绕一个对象或问题的竞争为其主角承担了越来越大的利害关系和重要性——并确定了三种不同的机制，可以产生越来越多的非物质利害关系。结果是，理论上，即使是小争执也可能因赌注膨胀而演变成重大冲突，尤其是当争执膨胀螺旋式上升时。为了说明这些在起作用的动态，