Introduction

For the three countries of the South Caucasus region, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, linked to the EU through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and a diverse set of Association, Cooperation and Partnership Agreements (Simão, 2018; van Gils, 2020), 2020 brought about three developments of supposedly seismic magnitude. The most significant event, affecting the region's geopolitical order, was the outbreak of the 44-day war between Armenia and Armenia-supported forces of the breakaway region of Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijan, aided by its brotherly ally Turkey. Preceded by skirmishes and small-scale military confrontations that had erupted intermittently since 1994 when Armenia and Azerbaijan had signed the Bishkek Protocol (Freizer, 2014, p. 110) that terminated the first war (1991–94), the 2020 war broke out on 27 September and ended on 9 November, following a Russia-mediated ceasefire agreement.11 https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/11/12/a-peace-deal-ends-a-bloody-war-over-nagorno-karabakh Throughout the six weeks of armed conflict, 5,970 combatants were killed22 https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer#1 and thousands of Armenian settlers displaced. As de Waal (2021) noted, the military conflict and the ensuing agreement resulted in ‘reversed roles of victor and defeated’ as Azerbaijan regained approximately one third of Armenia-occupied Nagorny Karabakh and the seven territories adjacent to it, held by Armenia since 1994.

The second major development in 2020 was the outbreak of domestic political crises in Armenia and Georgia. Their origins differed but effectively revolved around questions of legitimacy of, and alleged abuse of power by, the incumbent governments. In Armenia, in response to military defeat and the loss of territory, two multi-party alliances stoked nationalist sentiments and mobilized thousands of Armenians to engage in weeks-long protests against Prime Minister Pashinyan's war management, calling for his resignation.33 https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-opposition-names-joint-candidate-in-bid-to-pressure-pm/30982610.html In contrast, Georgia's crisis centered around contentious electoral reforms. Allegations of voting fraud in the parliamentary elections, held on 31 October, incited mass protests in Tbilisi against the ruling Georgian Dream Party, and on 8 November, leaders of the united opposition declared to boycott the second round of elections on 21 November and participation in future parliamentary sessions.44 https://jam-news.net/georgian-opposition-calls-on-public-to-boycott-the-second-round-of-elections/

The third development that compounded events on the local and regional level was the outbreak and spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. While the first wave could be contained by authorities in the three countries rather quickly, the number of new daily infections and deaths peaked in late 2020.55 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center, 7 May 2021. Regimes resorted to different measures such as limiting public life intermittently and forcing economies into temporary shutdowns. These, in conjunction with the global fallouts of the pandemic, have led to steep economic contractions of 5 per cent (Azerbaijan), 6 per cent (Georgia) and 8 per cent (Armenia)66 https://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/poverty-and-welfare-impacts-covid-19-and-mitigation-policies-armenia and, according to the UNDP (2021), a deterioration of already strained public finances and exchange-rate instabilities. Also, unemployment has soared in all three countries,77 https://jam-news.net/50-of-working-age-adults-are-unemployed-in-georgia/; https://tradingeconomics.com/azerbaijan/unemployment-rate; https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/unemployment-rate reinforcing endemic poverty, inequality, and poor micro-economic development.

How has the EU responded to these developments and how have they impacted EU-South Caucasus relations? After all, the ENP Review of 2015 had promised active involvement in the region. It pledged to ‘offer a tailor-made approach to cooperating on security-related matters’ [and to] ‘actively ensure that our overall engagement is conflict-sensitive’ (European Commission and HR/VP, 2015, p. 4). It declared that ‘all means available will be used […] to support the management of crises and the settlement of protracted conflicts in the neighbourhood’ (ibid., p. 13). The EU also committed itself to continue ‘to work with partner governments, civil society and citizens on human rights and democracy related issues, including electoral processes’ (ibid., p. 6). Lastly, the ENP heralded to ‘put stronger emphasis on health security aspects by strengthening country capacities to respond effectively to health threats including communicable diseases.’ (ibid., p. 14).

As will be discussed by this article, EU relations with the three countries of the South Caucasus remained largely unaffected by domestic crises and regional conflict, whereas EU responses variegated considerably. It is argued that variance is due to a mix of factors. On one hand, local and regional scope conditions and the role of other extra-regional actors provided differentiated opportunity structures for EU engagement. On the other hand, variegated responses are the result of intra-EU dynamics that oscillated between passivity, disinterest, go-alone attitudes of individual Member States, and consensus when action seemed needed and possible.

The article is divided into three main sections. The first section discusses the relevance of the Armenia–Azerbaijan war for EU relations with the two countries and examines EU (in)action. The subsequent section analyses and explains EU engagement in the domestic political crises in Armenia and Georgia, whereas the last section explains the reasons for, and nature of, EU responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the three countries. The article will conclude by offering reflections on the future of EU policies towards the South Caucasus in a post-pandemic setting.

中文翻译：

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南高加索地区的领土冲突、国内危机和 Covid-19 大流行。解释多样化的欧盟回应

介绍

对于南高加索地区的三个国家，亚美尼亚、阿塞拜疆和格鲁吉亚，通过其欧洲邻国政策 (ENP)、东部伙伴关系 (EaP) 和一系列不同的联合、合作和伙伴关系协议（Simão、  2018 年；van Gils，  2020 年），2020 年带来了三个据称具有地震震级的发展。影响该地区地缘政治秩序的最重大事件是亚美尼亚与亚美尼亚支持的纳戈尔内卡拉巴赫和阿塞拜疆分离地区的部队在其兄弟盟友土耳其的帮助下爆发了为期 44 天的战争。自 1994 年亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆签署《比什凯克议定书》（Freizer， 2014 年，第 110）结束了第一次战争（1991-94），2020 年战争于 9 月 27 日爆发并于 11 月 9 日结束，随后俄罗斯调解达成了停火协议。 11 https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/11/12/a-peace-deal-ends-a-bloody-war-over-nagorno-karabakh在为期六周的武装冲突中，有 5,970 名战斗人员被杀22 https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer#1成千上万的亚美尼亚定居者流离失所。正如 de Waal（2021 年）指出的那样，军事冲突和随后达成的协议导致“胜利者和失败者的角色颠倒”，因为阿塞拜疆重新夺回了亚美尼亚自 1994 年以来占领的纳戈尔内卡拉巴赫及其毗邻的七个领土的大约三分之一.

2020年的第二大事态发展是亚美尼亚和格鲁吉亚爆发国内政治危机。它们的起源各不相同，但实际上都围绕着现任政府的合法性和涉嫌滥用权力的问题展开。在亚美尼亚，为了应对军事失败和领土丧失，两个多党联盟煽动了民族主义情绪，并动员了数千名亚美尼亚人参加为期数周的抗议活动，反对总理帕希尼扬的战争管理，要求他辞职。 33 https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-opposition-names-joint-candidate-in-bid-to-pressure-pm/30982610.html相比之下，格鲁吉亚的危机集中在有争议的选举改革上。关于 10 月 31 日举行的议会选举中存在投票舞弊的指控在第比利斯引发了反对执政的格鲁吉亚梦想党的大规模抗议活动，11 月 8 日，联合反对派领导人宣布抵制 11 月 21 日举行的第二轮选举并参加未来的议会会议.44 https://jam-news.net/georgian-opposition-calls-on-public-to-boycott-the-second-round-of-elections/

第三个使地方和区域层面的事件复杂化的事态发展是 Covid-19 大流行病的爆发和蔓延。虽然这三个国家的当局可以很快遏制第一波浪潮，但每日新增感染和死亡人数在 2020 年底达到顶峰.55约翰霍普金斯大学和医学冠状病毒资源中心，2021 年 5 月 7 日。各国政府采取了不同的措施，例如间歇性地限制公共生活和迫使经济暂时停摆。这些，加上大流行病的全球影响，导致经济急剧收缩 5%（阿塞拜疆）、6%（格鲁吉亚）和 8%（亚美尼亚）66 https://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/poverty-and-welfare-impacts-covid-19-and-mitigation-policies-armenia并且，根据联合国开发计划署（2021 年），本已紧张的公共财政和汇率不稳定性的恶化。此外，这三个国家的失业率都在飙升，77 https://jam-news.net/50-of-working-age-adults-are-unemployed-in-georgia/；https://tradingeconomics.com/azerbaijan/unemployment-rate；https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/unemployment-rate加剧地方性贫困、不平等和微观经济发展不佳。

欧盟如何应对这些事态发展以及它们如何影响欧盟与南高加索地区的关系？毕竟，2015 年的 ENP 审查承诺积极参与该地区。它承诺“提供量身定制的安全相关事务合作方法”[并]“积极确保我们的整体参与对冲突敏感”（欧盟委员会和人力资源/副总裁，2015 年 ），页。4). 它宣布“将使用所有可用手段[……]支持危机管理和解决邻里长期冲突”（同上，第 13 页）。欧盟还承诺继续“与伙伴政府、民间社会和公民就人权和民主相关问题开展合作，包括选举进程”（同上，第 6 页）。最后，ENP 宣布“通过加强国家有效应对包括传染病在内的健康威胁的能力，更加重视健康安全方面”。（同上，第 14 页）。

正如本文将要讨论的那样，欧盟与南高加索三个国家的关系基本上没有受到国内危机和地区冲突的影响，而欧盟的反应却大相径庭。有人认为，方差是由多种因素造成的。一方面，地方和区域范围条件以及其他区域外行为者的作用为欧盟参与提供了不同的机会结构。另一方面，多样化的反应是欧盟内部动态的结果，这种动态在个别成员国的被动、冷漠、单干态度与似乎需要和可能采取行动时的共识之间摇摆不定。

本文分为三个主要部分。第一部分讨论了亚美尼亚-阿塞拜疆战争对欧盟与两国关系的相关性，并考察了欧盟（在）的行动。随后的部分分析并解释了欧盟对亚美尼亚和格鲁吉亚国内政治危机的参与，而最后一节则解释了欧盟对这三个国家的 Covid-19 大流行做出反应的原因和性质。本文最后将对大流行后环境下欧盟对南高加索地区政策的未来进行反思。