How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments about the Paris Agreement, which relies on social pressure for enforcement. Our experiments, administered to national samples in the United States, produced three sets of findings. First, shaming by foreign countries shifted domestic public opinion in favor of compliance, increasing the political incentive to honor the Paris Agreement. Second, the effects of shaming varied with the behavior of the target. Shaming was more effective against partial compliers than against targets that took no action or honored their obligations completely. Moreover, even partial compliers managed to reduce the effects of shaming through the strategic use of counter-rhetoric. Third, identity moderated responses to shaming. Shaming by allies was not significantly more effective than shaming by non-allies, but Democrats were more receptive to shaming than Republicans. Overall, our experiments expose both the power and the limits of shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement. At the same time, they advance our understanding of the most significant environmental problem facing the planet.

点名和羞辱如何影响公众对遵守国际协议的支持？我们通过对依赖社会压力执行的《巴黎协定》进行调查实验来调查这个问题。我们对美国的国家样本进行的实验产生了三组结果。首先，外国的羞辱使国内舆论转向合规，增加了履行《巴黎协定》的政治动力。其次，羞辱的影响因目标的行为而异。羞辱对部分遵守者比对不采取行动或完全履行义务的目标更有效。此外，即使是部分遵守者也设法通过战略性地使用反言辞来减少羞辱的影响。第三，身份缓和了对羞辱的反应。盟友的羞辱并不比非盟友的羞辱有效得多，但民主党人比共和党人更容易接受羞辱。总体而言，我们的实验揭示了羞辱作为执行《巴黎协定》的策略的力量和局限性。同时，它们促进了我们对地球面临的最重大环境问题的理解。