The two-settlement electricity markets are widely accepted. In current practice, the markets are cleared based on locational marginal prices. However, this market clearing scheme leaves arbitrage opportunities between day-ahead and real-time markets for strategic distribution system operators (DSOs). They can submit biased bids from their actual load forecasts in the day-ahead market for additional benefits. Worse still, due to the high penetration of distributed energy resources, the impact of such strategic behaviors becomes increasingly severe as the uncertainties in DSOs’ load forecasts increase. In this paper, we first identify the profitable arbitrage opportunities of DSOs and the impact of uncertainties by a simplified analytical model. We then propose a Nash bargaining solution based market clearing scheme for real-time coordination between the transmission system operator and the DSOs. This scheme guarantees the fairness of net-benefit allocation among all the operators, prevents the strategic behaviors of DSOs, and helps the consistency between day-ahead commitment and real-time operation. Finally, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on both a simplified system and a practical power system testbed.

中文翻译：

---

通过纳什讨价还价解决方案实时协调输配电网络


两国电力市场已被广泛接受。在目前的实践中，市场是根据当地边际价格进行清算的。然而，这种市场清算方案为战略分销系统运营商（DSO）留下了日前市场和实时市场之间的套利机会。他们可以根据日前市场的实际负荷预测提交有偏差的出价，以获得额外的好处。更糟糕的是，由于分布式能源的高渗透率，随着DSO负荷预测的不确定性增加，这种战略行为的影响变得越来越严重。在本文中，我们首先通过简化的分析模型确定了 DSO 的盈利套利机会以及不确定性的影响。然后，我们提出了一种基于纳什讨价还价解决方案的市场清算方案，用于传输系统运营商和 DSO 之间的实时协调。该方案保证了各运营商净收益分配的公平性，防止DSO的战略行为，有利于日前承诺与实时运营的一致性。最后，我们在简化系统和实际电力系统测试平台上验证了所提出方案的有效性。