This paper studies the impact of government support on the production and green investment of a manufacturing firm with financing needs. Two financial stimulus policies are explored: loan guarantee and interest subsidy. Based on game-theoretic models that incorporate the manufacturer's operations and the bank's risk preference, we attempt to explore the implications for the economic and environmental performance of government interventions. Our results reveal that: (1) both policies are effective in scaling up production volume and economic performance, but loan guarantee policy is ineffective in boosting green investment; (2) the downside risk the bank bears under the loan guarantee policy is not less than that under an interest subsidy policy, due to limited intervention from government; (3) it is optimal for the government to intervene in the manufacturer's financing activity when the environmental value is above a certain level. Further, we demonstrate that whether loan guarantee policy outperforms interest subsidy depends on consumers’ green awareness, green investment efficiency, environmental value, as well as bank's attitude toward risk. Finally, we test the robustness of our findings by extending the base models to other scenarios and find that the main results still hold in these extensions.

本文研究了政府支持对有融资需求的制造企业生产和绿色投资的影响。探索两种金融刺激政策：贷款担保和贴息。基于包含制造商运营和银行风险偏好的博弈论模型，我们试图探索政府干预对经济和环境绩效的影响。我们的研究结果表明：（1）这两项政策在扩大产量和经济效益方面均有效，但贷款担保政策在促进绿色投资方面效果不佳；（二）由于政府干预有限，银行在贷款担保政策下承担的下行风险不低于贴息政策下的下行风险；(3)当环境价值高于一定水平时，政府干预制造商的融资活动是最优的。此外，我们证明贷款担保政策是否优于贴息取决于消费者的绿色意识、绿色投资效率、环境价值以及银行对风险的态度。最后，我们通过将基本模型扩展到其他场景来测试我们发现的稳健性，并发现主要结果仍然适用于这些扩展。