We examine voluntary disclosure decisions when firms are uncertain about audience preferences and are risk averse. In contrast to classic “unraveling” results, some firms remain silent in equilibrium. Silence is safer than disclosure; silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm’s payoff to audience preferences. Increases in firm (audience) risk-aversion reduce (increase) disclosure. Our model explains why some firms do not disclose earnings breakdowns, executive compensation, or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance when they face diverse audiences, and why they disclose less under regulatory rules mandating that disclosure be entirely public.

当公司不确定受众偏好并且规避风险时，我们会检查自愿披露决策。与经典的“解体”结果相反，一些公司在均衡中保持沉默。沉默比公开更安全；沉默降低了公司回报对受众偏好的敏感性。公司（观众）风险厌恶的增加减少（增加）披露。我们的模型解释了为什么一些公司在面对不同的受众时不披露收益明细、高管薪酬或环境、社会和治理 (ESG) 绩效，以及为什么在强制披露完全公开的监管规则下披露较少。