ABSTRACT

Claims about Soviet policy at the end of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war played a key role in discrediting détente in the mid- and late 1970s. This analysis considers the part that Henry Kissinger played in triggering the Soviet actions at the end of the war to which the critics of détente pointed. Contrary to what Kissinger claimed, he essentially reneged on the agreement he had reached with the Soviet leadership to end the war and instead directly encouraged the Israelis to continue military operations well after the ceasefire was supposed to take effect. That, in turn, led to a crisis that had a profound effect on Soviet-American relations for years to come.

摘要

1973 年 10 月阿以战争结束时关于苏联政策的主张在破坏1970 年代中后期缓和的信誉方面发挥了关键作用。这一分析考虑了亨利·基辛格在战争结束时触发苏联行动的作用，缓和的批评者指出了这一点。与基辛格声称的相反，他基本上违背了与苏联领导人达成的结束战争的协议，而是直接鼓励以色列人在停火生效后很长时间继续军事行动。这反过来又导致了一场危机，对未来几年的苏美关系产生了深远的影响。