We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions may have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. As the delay between offers goes to zero, the equilibrium allocation of the model converges to a generalized version of a Nash bargaining solution in which—in contrast to the standard solution—the winning coalition is endogenous and determined by the relative coalitional values. A form of the holdup problem specific to these bargaining games contributes to generate significant inefficiencies in the selection of the coalition. The model helps rationalize well-known empirical facts that are in conflict with the predictions of standard noncooperative models of bargaining.

中文翻译：

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立法谈判中的联盟形成

我们提出了一种新的立法谈判模式，其中联盟可能具有不同的价值观，反映了他们可以采取的政策受到联盟成员身份的限制。随着报价之间的延迟变为零，模型的均衡分配收敛到纳什讨价还价解决方案的广义版本，其中与标准解决方案相比，获胜联盟是内生的，并由相对联盟价值决定。特定于这些讨价还价游戏的一种形式的拖延问题导致在选择联盟时产生显着的低效率。该模型有助于使与标准非合作谈判模型的预测相冲突的众所周知的经验事实合理化。