Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages and disadvantages in terms of detection accuracy and computational cost. Further, an attestation method may be applied in multiple ways, such as various levels of software coverage. Therefore, to minimize both security risks and computational overhead, defenders need to decide strategically which attestation methods to apply and how to apply them, depending on the characteristic of the devices and the potential losses. To answer these questions, we first develop a testbed for remote attestation of IoT devices, which enables us to measure the detection accuracy and performance overhead of various attestation methods. Our testbed integrates two example IoT applications, memory-checksum based attestation, and a variety of software vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to inject arbitrary code into running applications. Second, we model the problem of finding an optimal strategy for applying remote attestation as a Stackelberg security game between a defender and an adversary. We characterize the defender's optimal attestation strategy in a variety of special cases. Finally, building on experimental results from our testbed, we evaluate our model and show that optimal strategic attestation can lead to significantly lower losses than naive baseline strategies.

中文翻译：

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战略远程证明：物联网设备的测试平台和最佳策略的 Stackelberg 安全游戏

物联网 (IoT) 设备和应用程序可能存在重大漏洞，攻击者可能会利用这些漏洞造成相当大的危害。减轻这种威胁的一个重要方法是远程证明，它使防御者能够远程验证设备及其软件的完整性。远程认证有多种方法，每种方法在检测精度和计算成本方面都有其独特的优势和劣势。此外，可以以多种方式应用证明方法，例如各种级别的软件覆盖率。因此，为了最大限度地减少安全风险和计算开销，防御者需要根据设备的特性和潜在的损失，战略性地决定应用哪些证明方法以及如何应用它们。要回答这些问题，我们首先开发了一个用于物联网设备远程认证的测试平台，这使我们能够测量各种认证方法的检测精度和性能开销。我们的测试平台集成了两个示例 IoT 应用程序、基于内存校验和的证明以及各种允许攻击者将任意代码注入正在运行的应用程序中的软件漏洞。其次，我们模拟了寻找应用远程证明的最佳策略作为防御者和对手之间的 Stackelberg 安全博弈的问题。我们在各种特殊情况下描述了防御者的最佳证明策略。最后，基于我们的测试平台的实验结果，我们评估了我们的模型，并表明最佳战略证明可以比朴素的基线策略显着降低损失。