Comparative institutional analyses of social-ecological systems (SESs) have advanced our understanding of features and performances of single institutions such as state, market, and self-organized institutions. However, such studies have hardly extended our understanding of institutional diversity to combinations of different institutions and their joint impacts on the dynamics of SES. We address this gap by focusing on government-managed irrigation systems as a quintessential example of SESs. We developed a formal stylized model to examine how institutions affect social processes in a government-managed irrigation system. More specifically, we examine how infrastructure dynamics and farmers-agency interactions are affected under the coexistence of two institutions: groundwater market and participatory institutions. The former institutionalizes the use of private irrigation infrastructures as an exit option to the public infrastructure managed by a government agency (exit). The latter institutionalizes farmers' voicing of concerns and participation as a pressure mechanism on the agency (voice). The model results show that the joint effects of those institutions on system outcomes vary with the agency's reactions to the exit and voice. We also demonstrate that the silence option – use of neither option – is a double-edged sword. Silent farmers can impede infrastructure improvement, but in some cases, help it dramatically.

社会生态系统 (SES) 的比较制度分析促进了我们对国家、市场和自组织制度等单一制度的特征和表现的理解。然而，这些研究几乎没有将我们对制度多样性的理解扩展到不同制度的组合及其对社会经济地位动态的共同影响。我们通过将政府管理的灌溉系统作为 SES 的典型例子来解决这一差距。我们开发了一个正式的程式化模型来检查制度如何影响政府管理的灌溉系统中的社会进程。更具体地说，我们研究了在地下水市场和参与性机构这两个机构共存的情况下，基础设施动态和农民与机构之间的互动是如何受到影响的。退出）。后者将农民的关注和参与制度化，作为对机构的压力机制（声音）。模型结果表明，这些机构对系统结果的共同影响随着机构对退出和声音的反应而变化。我们还证明了静音选项——不使用任何选项——是一把双刃剑。沉默的农民可能会阻碍基础设施的改善，但在某些情况下，可以极大地帮助它。