How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.

我们看到怀孕的人时有多少人在场？在物质本体论框架内，这个问题恰好有两种可能的答案。标准答案——两个人——通常受到支持主流妊娠遏制观点的学者的拥护，根据这种观点，胎儿就像在容器中一样居住在妊娠有机体中。另一种答案——一个人——最近在部分观点中得到了支持，根据该观点，胎儿是妊娠有机体的一部分。在这里我提出第三个答案：怀孕个体既不是两个个体，也不是一个个体，而是介于一和二之间的个体。这是因为有机体最好被理解为过程而不是物质。我特别关注部分观点，解释了为什么怀孕的过程观（根据怀孕个体是一个分叉的超复杂过程）超越了物质本体论方法。