Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it’s thought that, on Kant’s moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violates the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant’s moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally wrong, even when no other persons or their avatars are affected. First, I explain why many have thought that, in general on Kant’s moral theory, virtual acts affecting no other persons or their avatars can’t violate the Categorical Imperative. For there are real world acts that clearly do, but it seems that when we consider the same sorts of acts done alone in a virtual environment, they don’t violate the Categorical Imperative, because no others persons were involved. But then, how could any virtual acts like these, that affect no other persons or their avatars, violate the Categorical Imperative? I then argue that there indeed can be such cases of morally wrong virtual acts—some due to an actor’s having erroneous beliefs about morally relevant facts, and others due not to error, but to the actor’s intention leaving out morally relevant facts while immersed in a virtual environment. I conclude by considering some implications of my arguments for both our present technological context as well as the future.

在虚拟环境中进行的暴力行为是否在道德上是错误的，即使没有其他人受到影响？虽然一些这样的行为肯定反映了道德品质的缺陷，但我关注的是行为的道德对或错。通常认为，根据康德的道德理论，只有当行为虐待另一个人时，虚拟暴力行为才在道德上是错误的（即违反绝对命令）。但我认为，根据康德的道德理论，一些虚拟暴力行为可以在道德上是错误的，即使没有其他人或他们的化身受到影响。首先，我解释为什么许多人认为，一般来说，根据康德的道德理论，不影响其他人或其化身的虚拟行为不能违反绝对命令。因为确实存在现实世界的行为，但似乎当我们考虑在虚拟环境中单独完成的同类行为时，它们并没有违反绝对命令，因为没有其他人参与其中。不过，怎么可能任何像这样不影响其他人或他们的化身的虚拟行为是否违反了绝对命令？然后我争辩说，确实存在这样的道德错误的虚拟行为案例——一些是由于演员对道德相关事实有错误的信念，而另一些不是由于错误，而是由于演员在沉浸于道德相关事实的同时有意遗漏道德相关事实。虚拟环境。最后，我考虑了我的论点对我们目前的技术背景和未来的一些影响。