We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1’s laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

中文翻译：

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V1 作为以自我为中心的认知图


我们通常将 V1 区分开来，作为以自我为中心的感知图，而海马体作为以异体为中心的认知图。在本文中，我们认为 V1 还具有后感知自我中心认知图的功能。我们认为，V1 的三个有据可查的功能，即（i）距离估计，（ii）大小估计，以及（iii）多感觉整合，可以更好地理解为后感知认知推理。这个论点有两个重要的含义。首先，我们认为 V1 必须充当视觉感知/认知区别的神经关联，并提出 V1 的层状结构如何适应这一点。其次，我们利用这一见解提出了一种视觉意识的低级解释，与中级解释（循环处理理论；综合信息理论）和高级解释（高阶思维；全局工作空间理论）形成鲜明对比。传统上使用检测阈值来排除这种方法，但我们解释了为什么将可见性（以及因此存在/不存在视觉体验）与检测阈值等同起来是错误的。