Shore-side electricity has been put forward to ease the pollution problem of ports. This paper considers a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, one port company, and the other port company, and establishes the payoff matrix of the three parties. Through analyzing the replicated dynamic equations, we find that only when the government selects the passive supervision and both port companies implement SSE can make the environmental benefit reach the maximum. Meanwhile, the larger port company is more forward-looking, which speeds up the evolution to be equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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补贴还是惩罚：实施岸电的演化博弈分析

岸电已被提出以缓解港口污染问题。本文考虑政府、一港口公司和另一港口公司三方演化博弈模型，建立三方的收益矩阵。通过对重复动态方程的分析，我们发现只有政府选择被动监管，两家港口公司都实施上证，才能使环境效益达到最大。同时，较大的港口公司更具前瞻性，加快了向均衡的演化。