Different from a classic Weberian bureaucracy, public service bureaucrats directly interact with citizens at the frontlines of government. These first responders use their discretion to meet some citizens’ needs but deliberately overlook the other clients. What lies beneath the street-level bureaucrats’ behavior in their contacts with citizens? This study develops a model to explain how street-level bureaucrats are motivated to move toward the public and the extent to which they are engaged in helping their citizens. The model is driven by costs and benefits of behavior based on the assumption that street-level bureaucrats are rational actors trying to maximize their utility. However, utility here is defined as more than self-interest; it is the set of outcomes valued by the bureaucrats such as reducing job-related stress, pursuing work-generated ends, serving needy citizens, and implementing good public policy.

与经典的韦伯式官僚机构不同，公共服务官僚机构直接与政府前线的公民互动。这些第一响应者使用他们的判断力来满足一些公民的需求，但故意忽略其他客户。街头官僚与公民接触的行为背后隐藏着什么？本研究开发了一个模型来解释街头官僚如何被激励走向公众以及他们参与帮助公民的程度。该模型是由行为的成本和收益驱动的，该假设基于街头官僚是试图最大化其效用的理性行为者。然而，效用在这里被定义为不仅仅是自身利益。它是官僚们重视的一系列成果，例如减少与工作相关的压力，