This paper analyses the performance and appropriateness of the Indonesian government’s ‘good governance’ institutional reform aimed at stimulating infrastructure construction. During the 15 years after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the government attempted to strengthen formal institutions with the goal of improving public investment efficiency and attracting private investors. By analysing policies in the construction industry in terms of company registration, procurement and state enterprises, the paper finds that the outcome was far from what was expected by technocratic-bureaucratic reform promoters as interest groups frequently succeeded in capturing the new institutional system. This paper then challenges the dominant narrative that overwhelmingly blames incomplete institutional reform for Indonesia’s slow infrastructure construction. Given the inherent market failure and political challenges in institutional reform, the paper argues that passive developmentalist policies, which resulted in conflictual state–business relations and insufficient public investment, were a prime cause that then set the stage for the emergence of state-led infrastructure development strategy from the mid-2010s.

本文分析了印尼政府旨在刺激基础设施建设的“善治”制度改革的表现和适当性。在 1997 年亚洲金融危机后的 15 年间，政府试图加强正规机构，以提高公共投资效率和吸引私人投资者。通过分析建筑行业在公司注册、采购和国有企业方面的政策，本文发现结果与技术官僚改革推动者的预期相去甚远，因为利益集团经常成功地捕捉到新的制度体系。然后，本文挑战了将印度尼西亚缓慢的基础设施建设归咎于不完整的制度改革的主流说法。